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Abstract
A subclass of games with population monotonic allocation schemes is studied, namely
games with regular population monotonic allocation schemes (rpmas). We focus on the
properties of these games and we prove the coincidence between the core and both the
Davis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set.
Resum
En aquest article s’estudia una subclase dels jocs cooperatius amb esquemes de dis-
tribucio´ mono´tons des del punt de vista poblacional, i que anomenem jocs amb esquemes
de distribucio´ regulars. L’ana`lisi es centra en les propietats d’aquests jocs i, com a resul-
tat principal, es demostra que el nucli del joc coincideix amb el conjunt de negociacio´ de
Davis-Maschler, aix´ı com tambe´ amb el conjunt de negociacio´ de Mas-Colell.
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1 Introduction
Cooperative games with transferable utility (TU) deal with the problem of freely dis-
tributing the profit arising from potential cooperation among agents (players). The idea
underlying games with population monotonic allocation schemes (Sprumont, 1990) is that,
for such games, it is worthwhile to add new players to a given and previously formed coali-
tion as the individual payoff received will benefit all its members. For instance, consider
a convex game (Shapley 1971) and suppose that, if a coalition forms, the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953) will be the allocation rule for distributing potential gains; in this case,
any coalition of agents will accept the entrance of new players since the individual profit
of already existing players increases if the Shapley value is applied.
Formally, let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players. For any coalition S ⊆ N , |S| or s
denotes the number of players in S. A cooperative game is a pair (N, v) where v : 2N → R
is the characteristic function such that v(S) is the worth of coalition S ⊆ N and v(∅) = 0.
The subgame of (N, v) corresponding to S is denoted by (S, vS) where vS is the restric-
tion of v to subsets of S. The set of cooperative games with player set N is denoted by GN .
Let P(N) = {S |S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅} be the set of nonempty subsets of N . An allocation
scheme (xiS)i∈S,S∈P(N) is a collection of allocation vectors such that each one corresponds
to some coalition S of players with
∑
i∈S xiS = v(S) and it is interpreted as the pro-
posed payoff distribution for the members of that coalition. In this context population
monotonicity can be expressed by the following condition:
for all S ⊂ T ⊆ N ⇒ xiS ≤ xiT , for all i ∈ S.
Population monotonicity explains, in a way, the fact that the total coalition N will
form, because the more players that enter the coalition, the better off they are. Con-
versely, once a coalition is formed it ensures that no player or set of players has incentives
to leave that coalition.
Many authors have worked on the concept of pmas: Slikker, Norde and Tijs (2003)
have shown that the class of games with pmas coincides with the class of information
sharing games; Voorneveld, Tijs and Grahn (2002) have studied pmas for the class of clan
games and define a more suitable concept for that model called bi-mas; Slikker (2000)
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studies population monotonicity in the context of graph restricted games; Hokari (2000)
analyzes population monotonic allocation schemes for convex games. Most of this work
has studied whether a solution generates population monotonic allocation schemes, or
whether a subclass of games has pmas. The aim of this paper is to study a restricted
class of games with pmas and, in particular, some core properties of these games. Let us
introduce this class of games.
Suppose S and T are two non-comparable coalitions with a non-empty intersection
(i.e. S 6⊆ T , T 6⊆ S and T ∩S 6= ∅). Population monotonicity does not impose restrictions
on the allocation corresponding to this pair of coalitions. This fact allows situations in
which some players who are in the intersection of the two coalitions might be better off in
one of these coalitions, while the rest will prefer to be in the other. The central hypothesis
of this paper is that, in such situations, all players that are in both coalitions S and T
should be better off in one of these coalitions. Formally,
for all S, T ⊆ N ⇒ either xiS ≤ xiT , or xiS ≥ xiT for all i ∈ S ∩ T.
Another way to tackle this situation is to suppose that a coalition S ⊆ N is formed
and their members have to decide whether to join coalition Q or coalition Q′ outside S.
This decision problem turns out to be irrelevant if all players in S will be better off (in
terms of the payoff received) by joining, for instance, coalition Q than coalition Q′. In
other words, we require that all players in S could rank in the same order of preference
potential entrant coalitions. This approach will be the starting point of this work and
will motivate the definition of regular population monotonic allocation scheme.
Definition 1 An allocation scheme (xiS)i∈S,S∈P(N) is regular population monotonic (in
short rpmas) if:
(i) for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and for all Q ⊆ N \ S,
xiS ≤ xiS∪Q for all i ∈ S;
(ii) for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and for all Q,Q′ ⊆ N \ S, Q 6= Q′
(xiS∪Q − xiS∪Q′) · (xjS∪Q − xjS∪Q′) ≥ 0, for all i, j ∈ S.
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Notice that condition (i) of regular monotonicity is just population monotonicity while
condition (ii) states that, given two players in S, i and j, if player i prefers (does not pre-
fer) to join coalition Q rather than Q′, so does (does not) player j. We call this condition
regularity.
Example 1 The following table describes the worth of all coalitions in a four-person
game and an allocation for each coalition:
S x1S x2S x3S x4S v(S)
{1} 1 - - - 1
{2} - 3 - - 3
{3} - - 0 - 0
{4} - - - 4 4
{1,2} 1 3 - - 4
{1,3} 3 - 1 - 4
{1,4} 4 - - 5 9
{2,3} - 3 0 - 3
{2,4} - 3 - 4 7
{3,4} - - 1 4 5
{1,2,3} 3 3 1 - 7
{1,2,4} 4 5 - 5 14
{1,3,4} 4 - 1 5 10
{2,3,4} - 3 1 4 8
{1,2,3,4} 4 5 1 5 15
Notice that in this game, besides population monotonicity, we can check regularity
just by comparing the allocation schemes corresponding to three-person coalitions: for
instance, if we take S = {1, 3}, Q = {2} and Q′ = {4}, notice that (shown inside boxes)
x1{1,2,3} ≤ x1{1,3,4} and x3{1,2,3} ≤ x3{1,3,4}. The reader may check regularity for other
possible pairs of three person coalitions.
Several examples of regular population monotonic allocation schemes can be found in
the literature. Some of them are the following:
A Labor-Managed firm (Dutta and Ray, 1989) A firm of n individuals is considered.
Output is produced by the combined effort of the individuals. Individual i is capable of
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producing αi units of a unique output, i ∈ N . For any coalition S, the total output is∑
i∈S αi. To set up a firm requires a fixed cost of c > 0,
∑
i∈N αi > c. Each coalition can
choose whether or not to set up a firm. Therefore the worth of a coalition S is given by
v(S) := max{
∑
i∈S
αi − c, 0}.
If we suppose (w.l.o.g.) that α1 ≥ α2 ≥ . . . ≥ αn, the egalitarian solution (Dutta and
Ray, 1989) for this model, E(v), is:
Ei(v) = 1k
[∑k
r=1 αr − c
]
> 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
Ei(v) = αi for i > k,
where k is either n, or the smallest integer such that 1
k
[∑k
r=1 αr − c
]
> αk+1.
The allocation scheme based on the egalitarian solution, i.e. xiS = Ei(vS) if
∑
i∈S αi >
c and xiS = 0 otherwise, is regular population monotonic. To check this, note that,
for all i ∈ S, Ei(vS) = min{λS, αi} where λS is such that
∑
i∈S Ei(vS) = v(S). Given
this parametric representation, notice that, if S ⊆ T ⊆ N ⇒ λS ≤ λT , which guaran-
tees population monotonicity. On the other hand, given a coalition S ⊆ N , and a pair
Q, Q′ ⊆ N \ S such that λS∪Q ≤ λS∪Q′ then Ei(vS∪Q) ≤ Ei(vS∪Q′) for all i ∈ S and so
regularity is also met. In another context, but formally identical to this model, we find
the class of bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982) which are a subclass of convex games.
Average monotonic games (Izquierdo and Rafels, 2001) A game (N, v) is average
monotonic if (i) it is positive (v(S) ≥ 0), and (ii) there exists a vector of weights α ∈ RN+ ,
α 6= 0 such that
{S ⊆ T ⊆ N} ⇒ {α(T ) · v(S) ≤ α(S) · v(T )}.
If αi > 0 for all i ∈ N this condition reads {S ⊆ T ⊆ N} ⇒ { v(S)
α(S)
≤ v(T )
α(T )
}. In this
context, the proportional distribution with respect to the weight α defines an rpmas of
the game, i.e. xiS = αi · v(S)α(S) , if α(S) 6= 0 and xiS = 0, otherwise. Other examples of
average monotonic games are Externality games (Grafe, In˜arra and Zarzuelo, 1998) and
Clan Games (Potters, Poos, Tijs and Muto, 1989); the previous model of a labor-managed
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firm and banruptcy games are also examples of these kind of games.
In general, games with rpmas are not always average monotonic games as exam-
ple 1 shows. To check this, let us suppose that the game is average monotonic with
respect to (α1, α2, α3, α4). Since v({1}) + v({2}) = v({1, 2}) and v({2}) = 3v({1})),
and from the definition of this class of games it follows that α2 = 3α1; analogously,
as v({2}) + v({4}) = v({2, 4}) and v({4}) = 4
3
v({2}), we have α4 = 43α2; and fi-
nally, as v({3}) + v({2}) = v({2, 3}) and v({3}) = 0, α3 = 0. Therefore, the vector
α should be of the form (1
3
a, a, 0, 4
3
a) with a > 0. But then, α({1, 2, 3, 4}) · v({1, 3, 4}) >
α({1, 3, 4}) · v({1, 2, 3, 4}) contradicting the definition of average monotonic game. Fur-
thermore, we can also check that the game is not convex (see definition in next section) as
v({1, 2, 3}) + v({1, 2, 4}) > v({1, 2, 3, 4}+ v({1, 2}). Thus, games with rpmas constitutes
a large subclass of games with pmas that generalizes average monotonic games and are
different from convex games.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we study properties of games having
rpmas and we provide (proposition 3) a sufficient condition in terms of positive linear
combination of simple monotonic games for a game to have an rpmas. Finally, in section
3 we prove - for this subclass of games - the coincidence between the core and both the
Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989) and the classical bargaining set (David and
Maschler, 1963, 1967).
2 Preliminaries
A game (N, v) is superadditive if for all S, T ⊆ N, S ∩ T = ∅, v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ).
A game (N, v) is zero-monotonic, if v(S)−∑i∈S v({i}) ≤ v(T )−∑i∈T v({i}), whenever
S ⊆ T ⊆ N . A game (N, v) is said to be convex if, for every S, T ⊆ N , v(S) + v(T ) ≤
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ). A game is a simple monotonic game if v(S) ∈ {0, 1} with v(N) = 1
and v(S) ≤ v(T ), whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ N . A simple unanimity game corresponding to
T ⊆ N , (N, uT ) is defined as uT (S) := 1 if S ⊇ T , and uT (S) := 0 otherwise; if T = {i}
we simply denote the game by ui.
Let RN stand for the space of real-valued vectors x = (xi)i∈N . Given x ∈ RN , x(S)
denotes
∑
i∈S xi, with x(∅) = 0 and xS ∈ RS is the restriction of x to S. The set of
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preimputations of a game (N, v) is defined by:
I∗(N, v) := {x ∈ RN |x(N) = v(N)}.
The set of imputations of a game (N, v) is defined by:
I(N, v) := {x ∈ RN |x(N) = v(N) and xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N}.
The core of the game (N, v) is defined by:
C(N, v) := {x ∈ RN |x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N}.
A game with a non-empty core is called balanced, and is called totally balanced if
each subgame (S, vS) is also balanced.
A game with rpmas keeps the basic properties of games with pmas, this is, zero-
monotonicity, superadditivity, balancedness and relative invariance under S-equivalence.
This last property means that for any game v with rpmas, any vector d ∈ RN and δ ∈ R+,
the game δ · v + d, where (δ · v + d)(S) := δ · v(S) + d(S) also has rpmas.
A notable property of games with pmas which is no longer preserved for games with
rpmas refers to the sum of games: given two games v and w with rpmas the sum game
v + w defined as (v + w)(S) := v(S) + w(S) is not necessarily a game with rpmas. The
next example shows this point.
Example 2 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let (N, u{1,2}) and (N, u{3,4}) be the simple una-
nimity games corresponding to coalitions {1, 2} and {3, 4} respectively. These games
are games with rpmas (as can be seen by computing the Shapley value for the corre-
sponding games and subgames). Nevertheless, the sum game v = u{1,2} + u{3,4} does not
have rpmas. To check this, let (ziS)i∈S,S∈P(N) be an arbitrary allocation scheme of the
game v. First, if population monotonicity must hold we have that ziS ≥ 0. Notice also
that v({1, 2}) = v({3, 4}) = 1 and so z1{1,2} + z2{1,2} = 1 and z3{3,4} + z4{3,4} = 1.
Furthermore and without loss of generality, we will suppose that, on the one hand,
z1{1,2} ≥ 0 and z2{1,2} > 0 and, on the other hand, z3{3,4} ≥ 0 and z4{3,4} > 0. In
this case, since v({1, 2, 4}) = 1 it should hold that z4{1,2,4} = 0 and, since v({2, 3, 4}) = 1
we have z2{2,3,4} = 0. Moreover again, if population monotonicity must hold, we have
z2{1,2,4} ≥ z2{1,2} > 0 and z4{2,3,4} ≥ z4{3,4} > 0. But then regularity is not satisfied
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for S = {2, 4}, Q = {1} and Q′ = {3}. For other cases, similar reasoning leads to an
analagous incompatibility.
Finally, in line with the characterization result given in Sprumont (1990, theorem 1)
for games with pmas, we state a sufficient condition for a game to have an rpmas in terms
of simple monotonic games with veto-power (i is a veto-player if v(S) = 0 for all S such
that i 6∈ S).
Proposition 1 Let (N, v1), (N, v2), . . . , (N, vm) a family of simple monotonic games such
that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vm. Then, if
v =
m∑
j=1
∑
i∈N
λji ·min{vj, ui}, λji ≥ 0, for all i ∈ N and j = 1, . . . ,m,
then the game (N, v) has an rpmas.
Proof. Define xiS =
∑m
j=1 λ
j
i ·min{vj(S), ui(S)}. Notice that
∑
i∈S xiS =
∑
i∈S
∑m
j=1 λ
j
i ·min{vj(S), ui(S)} = [ as ui(S) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S]
=
∑
i∈S
∑m
j=1 λ
j
i ·min{vj(S), ui(S)}+
∑
i∈N\S
∑m
j=1 λ
j
i ·min{vj(S), ui(S)}
= v(S).
This allocation scheme is population monotonic, since for any S ⊆ T ⊆ N we have
vj(S) ≤ vj(T ) and so, for all i ∈ S it holds that
xiS =
m∑
j=1
λji ·min{vj(S), ui(S)} ≤
m∑
j=1
λji ·min{vj(T ), ui(T )} = xiT .
Moreover, for all S ⊆ N it holds that
v1(S) ≥ v2(S) ≥ . . . ≥ vm(S).
Therefore, as these games are simple monotonic games, let us define jS as follows:
jS = card{j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}|vj(S) = 1}.
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Hence, let S ⊆ N and Q,Q′ ⊆ N \ S. If jS∪Q = 0 then v(S ∪ Q) = 0 and trivially
0 = xiS∪Q ≤ xiS∪Q′ for all i ∈ S. If jS∪Q > 0, let us suppose, without loss of generality,
that jS∪Q ≤ jS∪Q′ . In this case we have that, for all i ∈ S,
xiS∪Q =
m∑
j=1
λji ·min{vj(S ∪Q), ui(S ∪Q)} = (as i ∈ S and ui(S ∪Q) = 1)
=
m∑
j=1
λji · vj(S ∪Q) =
jS∪Q∑
j=1
λji ≤ (as jS∪Q ≤ jS∪Q′)
≤
jS∪Q′∑
j=1
λji =
m∑
j=1
λji · vj(S ∪Q′) =
m∑
j=1
λji ·min{vj(S ∪Q′), ui(S ∪Q′)} = xiS∪Q′ .
Hence, regularity is also satified. 2
This proposition describes a way to generate games with rpmas as a positive linear
combination of monotonic simple games with veto-power (notice that the game min{vj, ui}
is a monotonic simple game where i is a veto player).
Example 3 The game of example 1 can be decomposed as follows.
Let v1 = max{u{1}, u{2}, u{3}, u{4}}, v2 = max{u{4}, u{1,3}} and v3 = u{1,4}. Notice that
v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3. If we denote by vij = min{vj, ui}, then
v = v11 + 3v
2
1 + v
4
1 + 2v
1
2 + v
3
2 + 3v
4
2 + v
1
3 + 2v
2
3 + v
4
3.
It remains an open question whether this condition is also necessary.
3 The bargaining sets
It is known that in several classes of totally balanced games the core coincides with differ-
ent concepts of bargaining set: convex games, average monotonic games and assignment
games are some examples. Until now, there is no answer to the same question with re-
spect to the general class of games with pmas. The aim of this section is to prove that the
core of games with rpmas coincides with both the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell,
1989) and the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1963, 1967). Let us recall
these bargaining sets.
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The classical bargaining set includes the imputations that survive a bargaining process
comprising objections and counter-objections. Given a game (N, v) and y an imputation
of this game, an objection of player k against player l at y is a pair (T, u), where T is a
coalition containing k but not l and u is a vector in RT such that
u(T ) = v(T ),
ui > yi for all i ∈ T .
In addition, let (T, u) be an objection of k against l at y. A counter-objection to this
objection is a pair (M, z) , where M is a coalition containing l but not k, and z is a vector
in RM sucht that
z(M) = v(M),
zi ≥ ui for all i ∈ M ∩ T ,
zi ≥ yi for all i ∈ M \ T .
An objection is justified if there is no counter-objection to it. The classical bargaining
set of (N, v) is the set:
M(i)1 (N, v) = {x ∈ I(N, v) | no player has a justified objection at x against any other player}
Next, we define the Mas-Colell bargaining set. Let (N, v) be a game and let y be a
preimputation. An objection at y is a pair (T, u), where T is a non-empty coalition and
u is a vector in RT such that
u(T ) = v(T ),
ui ≥ yi for all i ∈ T , and at least one of the inequalities is strict.
Let (T, u) be an objection at y. A counter-objection to this objection is a pair (M, z)
where M is a non-empty coalition and z is in RM and satisfies
z(M) = v(M),
zi ≥ ui for all i ∈ M ∩ T ,
zi ≥ yi for all i ∈ M \ T , and at least one of the inequalities is strict.
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As before, an objection is justified if there is no counter-objection to it. TheMas-Colell
bargaining set of (N, v) is the set:
MB(N, v) = {x ∈ I∗(N, v) | no non-empty coalition has a justified objection at x}.
To prove the main result of this section, we use reduced games as a tool. Specifically,
we define a slightly modified version of the classical reduced game given in Davis and
Maschler (1965).
Definition 2 Given a cooperative game (N, v), a vector y ∈ RN , and a proper coalition
S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, the reduced game on S at y, (S, vSy ) is defined as,
vSy (∅) := 0,
vSy (R) := max∅⊆Q⊆N\S
{v(R ∪Q)− y(Q)}, for all ∅ 6= R ⊆ S.
Notice that, in contrast to the Davis and Maschler reduced game, the worth of the
grand coalition follows the same definition as that of other subcoalitions. The following
lemma states sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the core of this reduced game.
To make it easier to prove these results let us denote the reduced game as maximum of
games (S, vS,Qy ):
vSy (R) = max∅⊆Q⊆N\S
{vS,Qy (R)}, for all R ⊆ S.
where vS,Qy (R) = v(R ∪Q)− y(Q), for all ∅ 6= R ⊆ S and vS,Qy (∅) = 0.
Lemma 1 Let (N, v) be a TU game, x = (xiS)i∈S, S∈P(N) an rpmas of this game, y ∈
I∗(N, v) \ C(N, v), and let S ⊆ N be such that y(Q) ≥ ∑i∈Q xiS∪Q for all Q ⊆ N \ S.
Then, to each Q ⊆ N \ S there exists an allocation scheme zQ =
(
zQiT
)
i∈T, T∈P(S)
of the
game (S, vS,Qy ) such that
(a) zQ =
(
zQiT
)
i∈T, T∈P(S)
is population monotonic (define a pmas of the game (S, vS,Qy ));
(b) the following conditions holds:
xiT∪Q ≥ zQiT , for all T ⊆ S, all Q ⊆ N \ S and all i ∈ T ; (1)
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(c) for any coalition QM ⊆ N \ S such that v(S ∪QM)− y(QM) ≥ v(S ∪Q)− y(Q) for
all Q ⊆ N \ S it holds:
(c1) zQ
M
iS ≥ zQiS for all Q ⊆ N \ S and all i ∈ S.
(c2) zQ
M
S =
(
zQ
M
iS
)
i∈S
∈ C(S, vSy ) and so the reduced game is balanced.
Before proving this lemma let me remark that a direct consequence of item (a) is that
the reduced game (S, vSy ) is a maximum of games with pmas. Item (b) states that the
payoffs according to the new population allocation schemes are, in some sense, below the
original ones. Finally, item (c1) and (c2) gives a point in the core of the reduced game
and so states that the core of this game is nonempty. This point is precisely the payoff
vector to S corresponding to an allocation scheme mentioned in item (a). This lemma is
necessary to prove the main result in this section.
Proof of the lemma. First of all notice that, as x is an rpmas of the game v, we can describe
2N\S as an ordered set of elements {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm} such that Qk ⊆ N \S, k = 1, 2, . . . ,m
and xiS∪Qk ≤ xiS∪Qk+1 for all i ∈ S.
As a consequence, notice that
∑
j∈S
xjS∪Qk ≤
∑
j∈S
xjS∪Qk+1 , for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. (2)
Moreover, for all Q ⊆ N \ S, we have that
v(S ∪Q) =
∑
j∈S
xjS∪Q +
∑
j∈Q
xjS∪Q ≤
∑
j∈S
xjS∪Q + y(Q)
and so
v(S ∪Q)− y(Q) ≤
∑
j∈S
xjS∪Q. (3)
Hence, for any Q ⊆ N \ S, we will define the allocation scheme zQ =
(
zQiT
)
i∈T,T∈P(S)
in
two steps:
1. Taking into account the inequalities (2) and (3) and the description of 2N\S we first
define
(
zQiS
)
i∈S
as follows:
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(i) if
∑
j∈S xjS∪Qk < v(S ∪Q)− y(Q) ≤
∑
j∈S xjS∪Qk+1 then
zQiS := λ
Q xiS∪Qk + (1− λQ)xiS∪Qk+1 , (4)
where λQ ∈ [0, 1] and v(S ∪Q)− y(Q) = λQ
∑
j∈S
xjS∪Qk +(1−λQ)
∑
j∈S
xjS∪Qk+1 ;
(ii) if v(S ∪Q)− y(Q) ≤
∑
j∈S
xjS∪Q1 ,
zQiS := xiS∪Q1 −
∑
j∈S
xjS∪Q1 − [v(S ∪Q)− y(Q)]
|S| . (5)
Notice that zQiS ≤ xiS∪Q, for all Q ⊆ N \ S and that, by definition,∑
i∈S
zQiS = v(S ∪Q)− y(Q), for all Q ⊆ N \ S. (6)
2. For all Q ⊆ N \ S and for all i ∈ S let us first define δQiS := xiS∪Q − zQiS ≥ 0. Notice
that, being fixed Q ⊆ N \ S, for all T ⊆ S, T 6= ∅, we have
∑
i∈T
δQiS ≤
∑
i∈S
δQiS =
∑
i∈S
[xiS∪Q − zQiS] =
∑
i∈S
xiS∪Q − [v(S ∪Q)− y(Q)]
=
∑
i∈S
xiS∪Q − [
∑
i∈S∪Q
xiS∪Q − y(Q)] = −
∑
i∈Q
xiS∪Q + y(Q)
≤ −
∑
i∈Q
xiT∪Q + y(Q).
Hence, for any T ⊆ S, T 6= ∅, let us define
(
δQiT
)
i∈T
as follows:
δQiT := δ
Q
iS +
−
∑
i∈Q
xiT∪Q + y(Q)−
∑
i∈T
δQiS
|T | . (7)
Note that, for all T ⊆ T ′ ⊆ S, and all i ∈ T ,
δQiT ≥ δQiT ′ ≥ 0. (8)
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You may check easily this inequality upon definition (7) since −∑i∈Q xiT∪Q ≥
−∑i∈Q xiT ′∪Q, δQiS ≥ 0 and −∑
i∈T
δQiS ≥ −
∑
i∈T ′
δQiS.
Finally, for all T  S, T 6= ∅, we define
(
zQiT
)
i∈T
as:
zQiT := xiT∪Q − δQiT . (9)
Note that, since inequality (8) holds, the allocation schemes
(
zQiT
)
i∈T,T∈P(S)
defined in
(4), (5) and (9) are population monotonic (hence condition (a) of the lemma is satisfied).
Moreover, since δQiT ≥ 0, it also holds that xiT∪Q ≥ zQiT , for all T ⊆ S and all i ∈ T (hence
condition (b) of the lemma also holds). Finally, it follows from (4) and (5) that, for any
coalition QM ⊆ N \S such that v(S ∪QM)−y(QM) ≥ v(S∪Q)−y(Q) for all Q ⊆ N \S,
zQ
M
iS ≥ zQiS for all Q ⊆ N \ S and all i ∈ S. Thus condition (c1) of the lemma is satisfied.
Item (c2) is straightforward from (a) and (c1). 2
Now we will use two results from Holzman (2001). The first establishes (theorem 2.1) the
inclusion of the classical bargaining set in the Mas-Colell bargaining set for the class of
superadditive games:
if (N, v) is a superadditive game, then M(i)1 (N, v) ⊆MB(N, v).
The second proves that a preimputation y in the Mas-Colell bargaining set but not in
the core of the game is characterized by the emptiness of the core of the so-called excess
game. That is,
y ∈MB(N, v) \ C(N, v) ⇔ C(N,wy) = ∅,
where wy(S) := max
T⊆S
{v(T ) − y(T )} for all S ⊆ N . Combining these two results and
the fact that the core is included in both bargaining sets, it holds that for superadditive
games:
if C(N,wy) 6= ∅ for all y ∈ I∗(N, v), then M(i)1 (N, v) =MB(N, v) = C(N, v). (10)
This result will be the argument of the proof of the main theorem of this paper.
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Theorem 1 Let (N, v) be a game with rpmas. Then
M(i)1 (N, v) =MB(N, v) = C(N, v).
Proof. Let (xiS)i∈S,S∈P(N) be an rpmas of the game (N, v). If y ∈ C(N, v) it trivially holds
that C(N,wy) is non-empty as the null vector belongs to it. If y ∈ I∗(N, v) \C(N, v), let
us denote by S¯ a largest coalition of maximal excess at y. That is,
v(S¯)− y(S¯) ≥ v(S)− y(S) ∀S ⊆ N, and
v(S¯)− y(S¯) > v(S)− y(S) ∀S ⊇ S¯, S 6= S¯.
Hence, let us define
Ay(v) :=
{
S ⊆ S¯ | y(Q) ≥
∑
i∈Q
xiS∪Q, for all Q ⊆ N \ S
}
.
This set is nonempty as S¯ ∈ Ay(v). To check this, let us suppose that for some coalition
Q ⊆ N \ S¯ we have y(Q) < ∑i∈Q xiS¯∪Q. But then we will have that v(S¯) − y(S¯) <∑
i∈S¯ xiS¯ − y(S¯) +
∑
i∈Q xiS¯∪Q − y(Q) ≤
∑
i∈S¯ xiS¯∪Q − y(S¯) +
∑
i∈Q xiS¯∪Q − y(Q) =
v(S¯ ∪Q)− y(S¯ ∪Q), and this contradicts S¯ to be a coalition of largest excess.
Take a minimal element with respect to the inclusion in Ay(v), say S∗ (S∗ 6= ∅ as in
other case y ∈ C(N, v)), and notice that
vS
∗
y (S
∗) = max
∅⊆Q⊆N\S∗
{v(S∗ ∪Q)− y(Q)} = v(S∗ ∪Q∗)− y(Q∗), where Q∗ = S¯ \ S∗ (11)
Moreover, by lemma 1 taking S = S∗, it holds that for each game (S∗, vS
∗,Q
y ), ∅ 6= Q ⊆
N \ S∗, there exists an allocation scheme (zQiT )i∈T,T∈P(S∗) meeting items (a), (b), (c1) and
(c2) of the lemma ( for (c1) and (c2) we can take QM = Q∗).
Furthermore, it can be proved that
zQ
∗
iS∗ > yi, for all i ∈ S∗. (12)
To check this, we will show that if there exists a player j ∈ S∗ such that zQ∗jS∗ ≤ yj, then
S∗ \ {j} ∈ Ay(v) contradicting the minimality of S∗. For this purpose, take an arbitrary
coalition Q ⊆ N \ (S∗ \ {j}) and consider two cases:
16
• j 6∈ Q. Then, it is straightforward that
y(Q) ≥
∑
i∈Q
xiS∗∪Q ≥
∑
i∈Q
xi(S∗\{j})∪Q.
• j ∈ Q. In this case,
yj ≥ zQ∗jS∗ ≥ [by lemma 1 (c1)]
≥ zQ\{j}jS∗ = xjS∗∪(Q\{j}) − [xjS∗∪(Q\{j}) − zQ\{j}jS∗ ] ≥ [by lemma 1 (b)]
≥ xjS∗∪(Q\{j}) − [xjS∗∪(Q\{j}) − zQ\{j}jS∗ ]− [
∑
i∈S∗\{j}
(xiS∗∪(Q\{j}) − zQ\{j}iS∗ )]
= xjS∗∪(Q\{j}) − [
∑
i∈S∗
(xiS∗∪(Q\{j}) −
∑
i∈S∗
z
Q\{j}
iS∗ ] = [by (6)]
= xjS∗∪(Q\{j}) − [
∑
i∈S∗
xiS∗∪(Q\{j}) − v(S∗ ∪ (Q \ {j})) + y(Q \ {j})]
= xjS∗∪(Q\{j}) − [
∑
i∈S∗
xiS∗∪(Q\{j}) −
∑
i∈S∗∪(Q\{j})
xiS∗∪(Q\{j}) + y(Q \ {j})]
= xjS∗∪(Q\{j}) − [−
∑
i∈Q\{j}
xiS∗∪(Q\{j}) + y(Q \ {j})]
= [
∑
i∈Q
xiS∗∪(Q\{j}) − y(Q \ {j})] ≥
∑
i∈Q
xi(S∗\{j})∪Q − y(Q \ {j}),
and thus y(Q) ≥
∑
i∈Q
xi(S∗\j)∪Q, for all Q ⊆ N \ (S∗ \ {j}) where j ∈ Q.
Therefore S∗ \ {j} will be in Ay(v) and S∗ will not be a minimal coalition of this set,
contradicting the hypothesis on S∗. Now, we will prove that the excess game (N,wy) is
balanced where wy(S) := max
T⊆S
{v(T )− y(T )} for all S ⊆ N . In fact, we will show that the
vector r = (zQ
∗
S∗ − yS∗ ; 0N\S∗) ∈ C(N,wy).
First note that it is efficient since
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∑
i∈N
ri =
∑
i∈S∗
ri =
∑
i∈S∗
zQ
∗
iS∗ −
∑
i∈S∗
yi = [by (6)] = v(S
∗ ∪Q∗)− y(S∗ ∪Q∗) = wy(N).
Then, for all S  N , S ∩ S∗ = ∅ and for all T ⊆ S, note that y(T ) ≥
∑
i∈T
xiS∗∪T ≥∑
i∈T
xiT = v(T ) where the first inequality holds since S
∗ ∈ Ay(v) and T ⊆ N \ S∗.
Therefore, wy(S) = 0 and thus
∑
i∈S
ri = 0 ≥ wy(S), for all S  N , S ∩ S∗ = ∅.
On the other hand, for all S  N , S ∩ S∗ 6= ∅ we have that
∑
i∈S ri =
∑
i∈S∩S∗ ri =
∑
i∈S∩S∗(z
Q∗
iS∗ − yi) = [as zQ
∗
iS∗ > yi, see (12)]
= max
∅⊆R⊆S∩S∗
{
∑
i∈R
(zQ
∗
iS∗ − yi)} = max∅⊆R⊆S∩S∗{
∑
i∈R
zQ
∗
iS∗ − y(R)} ≥ [as zQ
∗
S∗ ∈ C(S∗, vS
∗
y )]
≥ max
∅⊆R⊆S∩S∗
{vS∗y (R)− y(R)}
= max
∅⊆R⊆S∩S∗
{ max
∅⊆Q⊆N\S∗
{v(R ∪Q)− y(Q ∪R)}}
≥ max
∅⊆R⊆S∩S∗
{ max
∅⊆Q⊆S\S∗
{v(R ∪Q)− y(Q ∪R)}}
= max
∅⊆T⊆S
{v(T )− y(T )} = wy(S).
.
Hence, we conclude that the excess game (N,wy) is balanced for any y ∈ I∗(N, v) and
so, by (10), that C(N, v) =M(i)1 (N, v) =MB(N, v). 2
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